Ecosystems and the concept of 'function' are complex topics that have been the subject of much debate among ecologists and philosophers. The author delves into the idea that ecosystems do not have intrinsic functions or goals, but rather, their roles are assigned by human needs and values. The notion of an ecosystem 'malfunctioning' is a human construct, reflecting our values and priorities, and not an inherent property of the ecosystem itself.
The author argues that the language of 'ecosystem function' is often used to describe processes that are anthropocentric, and that this can lead to a misunderstanding of ecological changes. The use of 'function' in ecology is traced back to the 19th and 20th centuries, where it was influenced by game laws, hunting traditions, and the work of Aldo Leopold. The concept of 'ecosystem services' further solidified this idea, linking ecological processes to human welfare.
The author then explores the philosophical theories of 'causal role theory' and 'selected effects theory' to understand how functions are defined. They argue that ecosystems, unlike human organs or machines, do not have a cohesive unit shaped by natural selection. The author emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between describing how something happens and making normative judgments about its purpose.
The author concludes that the notion of an ecosystem 'malfunctioning' should be understood in the context of human-defined goals and values. They suggest that ecologists should focus on characterizing ecosystem interactions and changes without imposing human values, and that environmental action should be based on a clear understanding of our obligations to ecosystems, rather than a blurred distinction between scientific description and moral responsibility.
